I need to say at the start that this is one of the first academic works on Counter-Terrorism that was written in the 1980’s. This was a time when you could negotiate with terrorists, they were far less extreme, and the safe return of hostages was the norm. In saying this, however, it still has much to offer us today and is still very useful in negotiating with groups such as Somali pirates who are looking for a financial gain for the return of goods, ships and hostages. The book is hard to get and I was finally able to get a copy form a French rural second-hand bookshop through Abebooks.

Professor Sloan is still one of the foremost experts in this field.

This book describes simulation as a method to train individuals and groups to respond effectively to terrorist attacks and details the results of 10 such full-scale simulations conducted with police and military forces in the United States and overseas.

The targets included military installations, airports, and corporate facilities; the victims were military personnel, police, foreign-service officers, and others who were vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their professions.

The text discusses techniques of writing the plot and script of a simulation and explains how to prepare the actors to be terrorists by helping them to identify with each other as members of a highly motivated group.

Additional topics include administrative guidelines for conducting realistic simulations while taking safety precautions, for choosing suitable personnel, and for gathering necessary arms and equipment. Emotional and intellectual responses of participants are discussed in relation to those of actual hostages and terrorists. Problems in developing an effective law enforcement response and patterns of hostage adjustment to terrorist incidents are considered.

Familiar patterns in the simulated incidents and in documented actual incidents are observed: (1) initial confusion and delay in the law enforcement response, (2) a gradual routine in negotiations with terrorists that can result in miscalculations as negotiators accelerate activity when they recognize that a climax is being reached, (3) a tendency to ignore the hostages as negotiations become complex and involved.

The text concludes that the development of consistent policies towards terrorism are thwarted by a fragmented response and that simulations are effective in learning to react to terrorist attacks. Two appendixes contain suggestions for conducting a simulation and discuss common patterns in a hostage-taking exercise with a skyjacking. Chapter notes, a bibliography of 53 citations, and an index are provided.

For those interested in “gaming” counter-terrorism then this is another must for your shelves.