I have to say I am not a fan of Blamey. Treading the line between Curtin and McArthur would not have been easy but his total misunderstanding of Kokoda conditions and his tirade against the 21st Brigade were inexcusable. The sacking of Rowell, Allen, and Potts was a transfer of blame to placate McArthur, and to prove he was in charge. Let alone his scandals while Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police just did not endear him to me.
As a result I would not have normally picked this book up but at a buck from the Salvos I thought I had nothing to loose, but a buck of course! I was pleasantly surprised and have had to re-think my view of the man.

The book offers a clear and balanced view of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey. Instead of painting him as either a failure or a hero, Taylor provides a nuanced portrayal. He describes Blamey as a skilled but imperfect commander facing tough political and strategic challenges. This biography focuses on balance and context, making it a valuable resource for those interested in Blamey and the Australian Army during the Second World War.
A major strength of the book is its fair reassessment of Blamey’s reputation. Taylor addresses criticisms about his personality, relationships, and ambition without letting them overshadow his military performance. He highlights Blamey’s skills in administration and organization, especially in managing the AIF in the Middle East and later rebuilding Australian forces after 1941–42. Taylor also shows how Blamey navigated complex relationships with British and American commanders while keeping a unique Australian command identity. The book convincingly argues that much of Blamey’s negative reputation stems from wartime rivalries, media bias, and historiographical trends rather than clear evidence of incompetence on the battlefield.
Another key strength is how Taylor places Blamey’s career within a wider operational and strategic context. Instead of viewing him only from a narrow national perspective, the biography connects him to the larger Allied command system. It examines British imperial command politics, Blamey’s challenging relationship with General MacArthur, and the pressures from the Curtin government and Australian public opinion. This broader view clarifies decisions that were controversial then and later, especially Blamey’s careful approach in New Guinea and his focus on protecting Australian forces instead of wasting them in costly battles. Taylor’s analysis shows that many of Blamey’s decisions were influenced by strategic factors rather than personal fear.
Taylor’s writing style is clear, direct, and highly accessible. He explains complex command relationships and strategic developments without unnecessary jargon, making the book suitable for both general readers and serious students of Australian military history. The narrative flows well and maintains a strong sense of momentum, allowing readers to follow Blamey’s career from the First World War through the interwar years and into the major campaigns of the Second World War with clarity.
There are, however, some limitations. While well researched and grounded in solid scholarship, the book is not a deeply revisionist archival study. Readers seeking extensive new documentary discoveries or highly detailed operational micro-analysis may find it more synthetic than groundbreaking. Some controversial aspects of Blamey’s career and personal life are handled with restraint and brevity, reflecting Taylor’s preference for balance rather than forensic examination. In addition, the emphasis on high command and strategic leadership means that tactical battle narratives receive less attention; readers interested primarily in detailed accounts of specific engagements may wish to supplement this biography with dedicated campaign histories.
Overall, Taylor presents Blamey as a highly competent staff officer and organiser, a politically aware commander navigating complex civil-military tensions, and a leader shaped by the realities of coalition warfare. The book suggests that Blamey’s greatest achievement lay not in dramatic battlefield victories but in preserving and rebuilding the Australian Army as an effective national force during a period when it might easily have been fragmented or subordinated entirely to Allied priorities. For military historians and wargamers alike, the biography offers valuable insight into command culture, coalition friction, and the relationship between strategy, politics, and operations. It stands as a thoughtful and fair-minded reassessment that significantly improves the quality of discussion surrounding one of Australia’s most controversial wartime commanders.
Well I was wrong. I would have gladly paid full price for this book.
I may be guilty of comparing apples with oranges, but for me, Sir John Monash will always be Australia’s greatest General, bar none. I’m doubtless being somewhat unfair, and Blamey may have not explained himself properly, but having done the Kokoda trek my opinion of Blamey and his criticism of Australian troops (who were militia!) could perhaps best be described as “sub-optimal.” I have little time for McArthur (my opinion of him rhymes with “anchor” but starts with a W). Bucko.