These have been on the painting desk for a while and I have just put the last coat on them and finished.

A Daemon Prince and another 16 strong Bloodletter units to go.

The story of Thao Thep Kasattri and Thao Sri Sunthon is the heartbeat of Phuket’s cultural identity and a defining moment in Thai history. To understand these two women, known originally as Chan and Mook, one must look back to the late eighteenth century. The year was 1785, and the newly established Chakri Dynasty in Bangkok was facing its greatest existential threat. The Burmese King Bodawpaya had launched what became known as the Nine Armies War, a massive multi-pronged invasion intended to crush the Siamese kingdom once and for all. While the main fighting raged in the north and center of the country, a specific fleet was dispatched to seize the wealth of the southern peninsula, specifically the tin-rich island of Phuket, which was then known as Thalang.

The situation in Thalang was dire. The governor of the island had recently passed away, leaving the local administration in a state of chaotic transition and the military defenses largely leaderless. Into this power vacuum stepped Chan, the widow of the late governor, and her sister Mook. These were not women of leisure; they were daughters of a prominent local family who understood the strategic importance of their home and the brutal reality of what a Burmese occupation would mean for their people.

han realized that they did not have enough trained soldiers to meet the professional Burmese army in a standard field battle. However, she also knew that warfare is as much about psychology as it is about steel. She and Mook organized a brilliant campaign of deception. They gathered the local women of the island and instructed them to dress in men’s clothing, donning the traditional uniforms of Siamese soldiers. They cut their hair short and carried wooden staves carved to look like muskets from a distance.

Image credit: @taarekrek via Instagram

For weeks, these disguised women marched around the perimeter of the Thalang fort in plain view of the Burmese scouts. They moved in constant rotations, appearing as a massive, unending reinforcement of fresh troops arriving from the mainland. To the Burmese commanders watching from the coast, it appeared that Thalang was an impenetrable fortress defended by a limitless garrison. This psychological pressure, combined with a month-long siege that exhausted the Burmese supplies and spread disease through their ranks, finally broke the invaders’ resolve. The Burmese fleet eventually retreated, and Phuket remained unconquered.

When news of this unlikely victory reached King Rama I in Bangkok, he was profoundly moved by the sisters’ bravery and ingenuity. He bestowed upon them the noble titles by which they are known today. Chan became Thao Thep Kasattri, and Mook became Thao Sri Sunthon. Their legacy transitioned from military history into the realm of spiritual guardianship, cementing them as the ancestral mothers of the island.

Every year in March, the island erupts in the Thalang Victory Memorial Fair to celebrate this anniversary. The highlight is a massive open-air historical drama featuring a cast of hundreds, including elephants and pyrotechnics, to reenact the siege on the very fields where it occurred. This two-week festival blends somber merit-making ceremonies by Buddhist monks with vibrant cultural displays such as Nora dances, shadow puppetry, and communal candy-making. It is a time when the mythic quality of the sisters is most visible, as the community comes together to play the roles of their ancestors, ensuring the tactical brilliance of the 1785 defense is never forgotten.

The physical manifestation of this reverence is most prominent at the Heroines Monument, which stands at the center of a major traffic circle in Thalang. This bronze statue depicts the two sisters standing side by side, dressed in traditional garb and carrying swords. It was inaugurated in 1967 and serves as the literal and figurative heart of the island. Travelers arriving from the airport often pass this landmark, and it is common practice for locals to honk their horns or offer a respectful wai as they drive past, acknowledging the protection the sisters continue to provide.

A more intimate site of worship is the Wat Pranang Sang temple, which is believed to be the site where the sisters organized their defense. However, for those seeking a deeper spiritual connection, the Thao Thep Kasattri and Thao Sri Sunthon Shrine offers a place for quiet reflection. Here, the atmosphere is heavy with the scent of jasmine and incense. Visitors offer yellow flowers, gold leaf, and small figurines of elephants or soldiers as tokens of gratitude. The statues inside the shrine are often draped in vibrant saffron and gold silks, reflecting the royal status bestowed upon them by the King.

The heroines represent a unique intersection of Thai values, combining the fierce independence of the southern people with a deep loyalty to the crown. They are a reminder that leadership does not always come from expected places and that wit can be just as sharp as any blade. Today, their presence is felt everywhere from the names of major roads to the quiet prayers whispered in front of their images. They remain the eternal sentinels of Phuket, ensuring that the spirit of Thalang is never forgotten.

The village of El-Haddara, having only recently recovered from its brief but energetic experience as a centre of imperial enthusiasm, found itself once again at the heart of events it had absolutely no desire to host.

Egyptian cavalry ordered to slow down the British advance get shot to pieces.

Following the unfortunate court martial of Sir Reginald Farquhar, whose command style was later described as “remarkably consistent, if not especially useful,” the British Army resolved to take a more hands-on approach to village management. Sir Reginald, last seen attempting to explain that remaining stationary was in fact a bold strategic doctrine, was quietly removed from proceedings and encouraged to pursue other interests, preferably elsewhere.

The British advance with an second Egyptian cavalry unit receiving the same fate as the first.

Into his place came a new officer—decisive, energetic, and deeply committed to the radical notion that units might occasionally move, and preferably in the direction of the enemy. Under this refreshed leadership, the British advanced on El-Haddara with great purpose, a clear plan, and only the faintest understanding of the ground they were advancing across.

The Egyptians, now in possession of the village and very much enjoying the novelty of being indoors, had taken up defensive positions in buildings, behind walls, and in any location that suggested a strong preference for not being shot at. They regarded the approaching British with a mixture of determination and mild irritation, having only just finished settling in.

The British assault unfolded with all the confidence of men who had recently replaced their commander. Lines were dressed, orders were issued, and several units advanced heroically in approximately the correct direction. Progress was steady, if occasionally interpretive, as officers attempted to align enthusiasm with geography.

Within the village, the Egyptians prepared to defend every alley, courtyard, and doorway, particularly those that offered shade. Shots rang out, dust rose into the air, and the buildings of El-Haddara once again found themselves participating in events far beyond their original design brief.

The Egyptians firmly ensconced in the village.

The villagers, for their part, adopted their now well-practised strategy of cautious observation mixed with quiet despair.

Unfortunately, news of Sir Reginald’s departure, and the British return, spread rather quickly across the desert. An Egyptian force, having previously been obliged to vacate the premises under somewhat hurried circumstances, has now returned with renewed determination, a clearer plan, and a distinct lack of interest in leaving again.

Egyptian cavalry dispersed

A second Egyptian cavalry take to the hills, or rather, sand dunes.

Depleted British infantry reach a building and have started to set fire to it.

Their objective is straightforward: retake the village, restore their honour, and ideally do so before the British can set fire to anything else of importance.

Egyptian infantry scampering from the village.

Thus, El-Haddara once again prepares itself for battle. The well remains in its usual place, the goats continue their administrative duties, and the buildings—those that survived—stand nervously awaiting their fate.

The British advance on El-Haddara

A long range shot halted the British which probably decided the game.

One building successfully on fire. One more should result in a British victory.

With two units trying to set fire to the second building will the British secure victory?

The sole surviving Egyptian unit.

Only three more fire points to achieve victory!

With all but one of the Egyptian units making a dramatic exit from the field, it looked like victory had already booked its one-way ticket back to the British camp, probably with a cocktail in hand, sand in its shoes, and an exaggerated story to tell. But hold your horses this plot twist wasn’t finished just yet!

In a hilarious twist of fate, the Egyptians turned accounting into an art form, racking up a whopping 2 victory points for each of the two buildings that stubbornly refused to take a dip in the flames, while the British forces, who were more like rare collectibles at this point, scored exactly zero for being blown to bits, largely because there just weren’t enough of them left to even lie down dramatically. Meanwhile, the British discovered that heroically chasing the enemy off the table was worth as much as a soggy biscuit in a rainstorm. Not a single point. Not even a friendly nod! Their only crumb of comfort was a paltry three points for lighting one building on fire, which, though it dazzled the eye, turned out to be about as useful as a chocolate teapot in terms of strategy.

Thus, in one of those classic wargaming escapades that only the dice gods can conjure, the Egyptians pulled off a spectacular tactical defeat, because let’s be honest, bolting in an orderly fashion is still just bolting, yet, somehow, against all odds, managed to snag a strategic victory by the skin of their teeth. One can just picture their commanders later giving elaborate speeches, insisting that everything went precisely according to plan, as long as you conveniently overlook the chaos that actually unfolded.

And somewhere in the distance, one suspects, Sir Reginald is still standing exactly where he was told to remain

MWWBK’s always gives a great game.

Just War theory has long provided a framework through which political leaders, theologians, and scholars assess the moral legitimacy of armed conflict. Developed within the Christian intellectual tradition through the writings of Augustine of Hippo and later systematised by Thomas Aquinas, the theory seeks to reconcile the moral prohibition against violence with the reality that war may sometimes be necessary to restrain injustice. In contemporary analysis the tradition is normally divided into two categories: jus ad bellum, which governs the justice of entering war, and jus in bello, which governs the conduct of war once fighting has begun. Applying these criteria to the recent United States attack on Iran, and comparing the case with the Iraq War and the Six-Day War, highlights the enduring tensions between security, legality, and moral justification in modern warfare.

Damage on Iran military site

The first requirement of jus ad bellum is just cause, most commonly understood as defence against aggression or imminent threat. The United States has justified military action against Iran primarily on the grounds of preventing future threats, particularly those associated with nuclear capability and regional destabilisation. However, Just War theory traditionally requires evidence of an immediate or clearly impending attack. Without such evidence, military action risks being classified as preventive war, which classical Just War theorists generally regard as morally suspect. In this respect, the American attack on Iran bears similarities to the rationale used in the Iraq War of 2003. The U.S. administration at that time argued that the regime of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a serious threat. Yet the absence of such weapons following the invasion undermined the claim of just cause and led many scholars to judge the war as inconsistent with traditional Just War criteria. By contrast, the Israeli decision to strike first in the Six-Day War was widely interpreted by many historians as a response to immediate and credible threats. Egyptian troop mobilisation in Sinai, the closure of the Straits of Tiran, and explicit statements by regional leaders created a perception of imminent conflict. Although debate continues among historians, many analysts view Israel’s pre-emptive strike as closer to a legitimate act of anticipatory self-defence than the American actions in either Iraq or Iran.

Reuters Press

The second key criterion is legitimate authority, meaning that war must be declared by a recognised political authority acting within legal bounds. In democratic systems this requirement often raises questions regarding constitutional processes. In the case of the American attack on Iran, critics argue that the absence of formal congressional authorisation raises doubts about the legitimacy of the decision under both domestic constitutional law and international norms. Similar debates occurred during the Iraq War, where the U.S. Congress authorised the use of force but the invasion lacked explicit approval from the United Nations Security Council, thereby weakening claims of international legitimacy. The Six-Day War, however, occurred within a different strategic and legal environment. Israel’s government acted as the recognised authority of the state in response to what it perceived as an immediate military threat from neighbouring states, a context that strengthened the perception of legitimate defensive action.

Another central requirement of Just War theory is last resort, which holds that all reasonable diplomatic options must be exhausted before military force is used. The American attack on Iran has been criticised on the grounds that diplomatic avenues, including negotiation and sanctions, had not completely failed. Critics therefore argue that the resort to military force may have been premature. A similar critique was levelled against the Iraq War, where inspections by the United Nations were still ongoing when the invasion began. By contrast, proponents of Israel’s actions in 1967 argue that the rapid deterioration of the strategic situation and the mobilisation of surrounding armies created conditions in which waiting could have resulted in catastrophic military disadvantage. Thus the Six-Day War is often presented as a case where leaders believed no viable diplomatic alternatives remained.

Fox News

Just War theory also requires proportionality and probability of success. The anticipated benefits of war must outweigh the foreseeable harm, and military action must have a reasonable chance of achieving its stated objectives. The Iraq War illustrates the dangers of misjudging these criteria. While the invasion rapidly toppled the Iraqi regime, the subsequent insurgency and regional instability produced costs far exceeding the initial expectations of policymakers. Critics fear that a similar dynamic could emerge in a prolonged conflict with Iran, given the country’s size, population, and capacity to mobilise regional proxy forces. By contrast, the Six-Day War achieved its immediate military objectives in a brief and decisive campaign. Although the long-term political consequences of the conflict remain deeply contested, the short-term military success arguably satisfied the criterion of probability of success more clearly than either Iraq or the current confrontation with Iran.

Finally, jus in bello governs the ethical conduct of military operations once war has begun. The principles of discrimination and proportionality require combatants to distinguish between military targets and civilians and to use force only to the extent necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives. All three conflicts have generated debate on this issue. Civilian casualties and infrastructural damage in Iraq drew sustained criticism from international observers, while contemporary reports of strikes in Iran have similarly raised concerns about the protection of civilian populations. Even in the Six-Day War, despite its rapid conclusion, allegations of excessive force and treatment of prisoners remain subjects of historical discussion. These debates demonstrate that even when the decision to enter war may appear justified, the manner in which the war is fought continues to raise profound ethical questions.

In conclusion the comparison of the United States attack on Iran with the Iraq War and the Six-Day War demonstrates both the continuing relevance and the growing difficulty of applying Just War theory in modern strategic environments. The classical framework developed by Augustine of Hippo and later refined by Thomas Aquinas assumed a world in which acts of aggression were relatively visible and where the boundaries between war and peace were more clearly defined. Contemporary conflicts, by contrast, frequently arise from ambiguous threats, intelligence assessments, and preventive strategic calculations. As a result, the criteria of just cause, last resort, and proportionality often become matters of interpretation rather than objective judgement.

“The house was shaking” – Iranians describe US attack. BBC

In the case of the U.S. action against Iran, the central ethical question concerns whether preventive or anticipatory force can satisfy the requirement of just cause. Classical Just War theory traditionally permitted war in response to aggression or an imminent threat but was deeply sceptical of wars initiated to eliminate possible future dangers. The debate surrounding Iraq in 2003 illustrates the consequences of stretching this principle. When the anticipated weapons of mass destruction failed to materialise, the moral and legal justification for the war was widely questioned, and the credibility of preventive war arguments was significantly weakened. If the American action against Iran rests on a similar preventive rationale, it risks reproducing the same moral controversy that characterised the Iraq conflict.

By contrast, the Six-Day War often appears in Just War discussions as a more plausible example of anticipatory self-defence. Israeli leaders believed that surrounding Arab forces were preparing for immediate hostilities, and that delaying action would place Israel at a severe strategic disadvantage. Whether that perception was entirely accurate remains debated among historians, yet the crisis atmosphere of May–June 1967 produced a situation in which the distinction between defensive and pre-emptive war became blurred but still recognisable. This contrast highlights an important lesson: Just War reasoning is heavily dependent upon the perceived immediacy and certainty of threat. Where the threat is clear and immediate, anticipatory action may be morally defensible. Where the threat is speculative or distant, the justification weakens considerably.

Iran attack on Israel AP News

Another important implication concerns legitimate authority and international order. Modern wars rarely occur in a legal vacuum; they take place within an international system shaped by institutions such as the United Nations and by evolving norms governing the use of force. The Iraq War demonstrated how the absence of broad international legitimacy can undermine even a militarily successful campaign. Similar questions arise in the case of Iran. Even if military action achieves limited tactical goals, the absence of widely recognised authority or consensus may erode the perceived legitimacy of the operation and complicate long-term strategic outcomes. Just War theory therefore remains relevant not only as a moral framework but also as a practical guide for sustaining international legitimacy.

NPR News

Finally, the comparison underscores the enduring importance of prudence, a virtue frequently emphasised within the Just War tradition. War may be morally permissible under certain conditions, but it remains an instrument of last resort whose consequences are inherently unpredictable. Iraq illustrates how initial military success can lead to prolonged instability and unintended geopolitical consequences. The Six-Day War demonstrates that even a rapid and decisive victory can generate complex and enduring political disputes. Any military confrontation with Iran therefore carries risks extending far beyond the immediate battlefield, including regional escalation, economic disruption, and long-term strategic rivalry.

For these reasons, the application of Just War theory to the American attack on Iran does not produce a simple or definitive verdict. Instead, it exposes the tensions between preventive security strategies and the moral restraints traditionally imposed on warfare. The framework continues to serve an essential purpose: it compels policymakers, military leaders, and scholars to examine not only whether war can be won, but whether it ought to be fought. In an era of increasingly complex geopolitical threats, this ethical discipline remains indispensable for evaluating the legitimacy and consequences of armed conflict.

Selected Bibliography

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

John Keegan, The Iraq War (London: Hutchinson, 2004).

Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998).